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European Political Cooperation and the
Benefits of a European Community
Foreign Policy: A Case Study of the
EC's Response to the Persian
Gulf Crisis
BARBARA CAMPBELL POTTER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, the European nations have exercised their foreign
affairs powers according to their own national agendas. While the
European Community ("EC") Member States largely continue to act
in this manner, the world has witnessed, in the last thirty years, the
infancy of a European unification movement in foreign affairs. The
most recent example of this movement arises in the Single European
Act ("SEA" or the "Act"),1 which became effective July 1, 1987. The
SEA represents the fusion of the treaty amending the three existing
EC treaties and the treaty codifying the mechanism known as Euro-
pean Political Cooperation ("EPC").2
This Article advocates the expansion of the EC's role in foreign
affairs. This Article first discusses the structure of the SEA as it re-
lates to EPC. Second, it examines Member States' obligations as es-
tablished by the SEA and how they change under EPC. Next, this
Article presents a case study of the EC's response to Iraq's recent
invasion of Kuwait. This illustrates the importance of the EC's
speaking with one voice in foreign affairs. Finally, this Article enu-
* B.A., University of Michigan, 1983; J.D., Wayne State University Law School, 1988;
LL.M., International and Comparative Law, Georgetown University Law Center, 1992. The
author is an Attorney-Advisor, Office of the Chief Counsel for Import Administration, Office
of the General Counsel, United States Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. The
views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position of the
Department of Commerce or of the United States Government.
1. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC
TREATY] May 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (as amended 1987). The Act was signed by all
twelve Member States by February of 1986, but was not effective until July 1, 1987.
2. Eric Stein, European Foreign Affairs and the Single European Act of 1986, 23 INT'L
LAW. 977, 980 (1989). Professor Stein suggests that the name of the Act alone is a symbolic
gesture of unity, since it fuses these documents into a workable whole. Id.
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merates the benefits of enlarging the EC's role in foreign affairs
through EPC.
II. THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT AND EUROPEAN POLITICAL
COOPERATION
A. EPC's Structure Under the SEA: A Roadmap to Unification
Notwithstanding the dichotomy of the SEA, there is unity in its
dual goals. As mentioned, the SEA amended existing treaties and for-
malized EPC. The SEA intentionally separated the European Com-
munities from EPC. The SEA's goals find unity, however, in its
Preamble which speaks of "the [Member States'] will to... transform
relations as a whole among States into a European Union."' 3
Title I, which states that "[t]he European Communities and Eu-
ropean Political Co-operation shall have as their objective to contrib-
ute together to making concrete progress towards European unity,' 4
espouses a European union. The selection of these words alone sug-
gests an explicit return to the original vision of an organic European
whole. The focus is once again on the achievement of a common
identity and a true European community, and not on the individual
Member State and its preoccupation with idiosyncratic sovereign
concerns.
Titles II and III of the Act further highlight the pronounced dia-
lectic of unity and separation of the SEA. Title II amends the existing
treaties but does not implicate the EPC.5 Title III, on the other hand,
deals exclusively with the EPC, ensuring that the entire EPC process
operates outside the scope of the EC legal order. 6 To this same end,
Article 31 of Title IV specifically excludes EPC from the jurisdiction
of the European Court of Justice. 7
B. EPC Obligations Under the SEA
The SEA enumerates certain foreign affairs obligations under
which the Member States must operate. Article 30 sections (1)
through (12) of the SEA reflect the first legal commitment to the con-
3. EEC TREATY pmbl.
4. Id. tit. I.
5. Id. tit. II.
6. Id. tit. III. Jules Lonbay, The Single European Act, 11 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
31, 56 (1988). See also Hans-Joachim Glaesner, The Single European Act: Attempt at an Ap-
praisal, 10 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 446, 451 (1987).
7. EEC TREATY tit. IV.
444 [Vol. 15:443
European Political Cooperation
cept of a European foreign policy.8 Article 30(1) sets forth the objec-
tive of EPC: "to endeavor jointly to formulate and implement a
European foreign policy." 9 The EC should attain this goal through
information exchange, consultation, the adoption of common posi-
tions, and joint action.1O Additionally, subparagraph (c) of Article
30(2) imposes an obligation on the High Contracting Parties to "take
full account" of the positions of others and "give due consideration"
to "common European positions."1 By using the word "shall," the
SEA commands Member States to perform these duties. Further, the
Member States "shall ensure that common principles and objectives
are gradually developed and defined" and that such common posi-
tions "shall constitute a point of reference for the policies of the High
Contracting Parties.' 2 Also noteworthy is the obligation to consult
on "any foreign policy matters of general interest.'' 3
Meanwhile, Article 30(2)(d) sets forth an important negative ob-
ligation of the Member States: they "shall endeavor to avoid any ac-
tion or position which impairs their effectiveness as a cohesive
force.''4 This provision mandates that Member States refrain from
positions or actions that would undermine a common European posi-
tion in foreign affairs. Several provisions of Title III further concern
the interaction between EPC and the European Community institu-
tions.' 5 Most notably, Article 30(5) establishes that the external poli-
cies of the EC and the EPC "must be consistent." 16 This same
provision vests the responsibility for such consistency with the Presi-
dency and the Commission jointly.' 7
Finally, Article 30(10) provides for one of the more novel fea-
tures of Title III. It establishes a Secretariat, based in Brussels, to
"assist the Presidency in preparing and implementing the activities of
8. See Simon Nuttal, European Political Co-operation and the Single European Act, 5
Y.B. EUR. L. 203, 209 (1986).
9. EEC TREATY art. 30(1).
10. Id. art. 30(2).
11. Id. art. 30(2)(c). The EC probably used the term "High Contracting Parties" instead
of "Member States" throughout Article (30) of the SEA to signify and highlight the separate-
ness of the SEA in accordance with the existing treaties on the one hand, and EPC on the
other. See Stein, supra note 2, at 982.
12. EEC TREATY art. 30(2)(c).
13. Id. art. 30(2)(a) (emphasis added).
14. Id. art. 30(2)(d).
15. Id. tit. III; see also Lonbay, supra note 6, at 56-57; Glaesner, supra note 6, at 451.
16. EEC TREATY art. 30(5).
17. Id.
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European Political Cooperation." 1 8 Finally, Article 30(12) provides
for review to consider possible revision of Title III five years after
SEA's enactment.' 9 This review date coincides with the target year
for integration of the European single market, 1992.20
C. Changes in EPC in the Wake of the SEA
EPC was established in 1970 and operated until 1986 without
any structured framework or legal basis. 21 The SEA changed this in
1986 by legitimizing an EPC that now involves legal obligations. 22
Thus, the most significant aspect of the SEA is that it elevates the
structure and process of the EPC to the level of treaty commit-
ments.23 One important change in EPC is the SEA's establishment of
the European Council as a legal body.24 Title I, Article 2 of the Act
provides, "the European Council shall bring together the Heads of
State of Government of the Member States and the President of the
Commission of the European Communities. ' ' 25 Moreover, the SEA
has greatly enhanced the role of the Commission of the European
Communities ("Commission") in EPC. The SEA charges the Com-
mission with the shared responsibility of maintaining consistency be-
tween EPC policies and the EC's external policies. 26
In light of the obligations and changes in EPC caused by the
SEA, the EC has taken a forward stride in its commitment to a Euro-
pean foreign policy. The two striking obligations which form the crux
of this new EPC program are "to agree positively to attempt a com-
mon policy and agree negatively to avoid any unilateral policies which
might diminish the standing of the Community. ' 27 Therefore, while
Title III of the SEA does not require that the Member States in fact
reach a common foreign policy, it does require that they affirmatively
18. Id art. 30(10).
19. Id. art. 30(12).
20. See generally Stein, supra note 2.
21. Panayiotis Ifestos, European Political Cooperation (EPC): Its Evolution From 1970 to
1986, and the Single European Act, 11 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 47, 49-50 (1987).
22. Id.
23. Daniel T. Murphy, European Political Cooperation After the Single European Act: The
Future of Foreign Affairs in the European Communities, 12 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 335,
337 (1989).
24. EEC TREATY art. 2.
25. Id.
26. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
27. Murphy, supra note 23, at 348.
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"endeavor" to achieve this end.28
In short, as to EC foreign affairs, the SEA's most powerful man-
date to Member States is that they consult and exchange information.
This provides a forum for dialogue which may independently serve to
reduce jealousies and mistrust among Member States when dealing
with issues of national sovereignty. Some may argue that the SEA's
treatment of EPC merely recognizes existing informal practices.
However, the more plausible interpretation is that the SEA's institu-
tionalization of EPC, with its attendant obligations, represents sub-
stantial progress in European foreign affairs unity.
29
III. A CASE STUDY: THE EC's RESPONSE TO IRAQ'S INVASION
OF KUWAIT
The Gulf crisis illustrates how these common foreign policy goals
have actually fared in practice. Iraq's August 2, 1990 invasion of Ku-
wait sent the world into a political and economic tailspin. On August
6, 1990, the United Nations Security Council voted in favor of impos-
ing a sweeping trade embargo against Iraq and occupied Kuwait.
30
On that same day, then United States President George Bush declared
a national emergency and ordered United States forces to Saudi Ara-
bia to defend against Iraqi attack. This made "Operation Desert
Shield" a household term 3' and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein only
increased the cries of world outrage by annexing Kuwait on August 8,
1990.32
Some evidence exists that the twelve EC members reacted in a
unified fashion, albeit at the initiative of others. The Member States
joined together to aid the United States in imposing broad trade sanc-
tions. 33 These sanctions included the suspension of Iraq's preferred
trade status with the EC, a ban on oil imports from Iraq and Kuwait,
an arms embargo, the suspension of all military, technical, and scien-
tific trade with Iraq and a freeze on Iraqi assets.
34
28. Stuart S. Malawer, Foreign Policy & Treaty Power of the European Community, 16
VA. B. ASS'N J. 15, 17 (Summer 1990).
29. See George A. Bermann, The Single European Act: A New Constitution for the Com-
munity?, 27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 529, 564 (1989).
30. U.S. Sends Forces to Saudi Arabia; Iraq Annexes Kuwait; UN. Imposes Sanctions;
US-Iraq War Fears Rise, FACTS ON FILE, WORLD NEWS DIGEST, Aug. 10, 1990, at A1:581,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Facts File.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
1993]
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The EC displayed unity at an emergency meeting on August 10,
1990. The EC foreign ministers warned Iraqi President Saddam Hus-
sein that if harm befell any EC citizen, "it would provoke a unified
response."3' 5 They also underlined the intention to retain diplomatic
presence in Iraq and Kuwait, despite Iraqi objections.3 6 This show of
unity in EC foreign policy, however, eroded as the Gulf crisis
progressed. In short, the EC may have failed its most recent test of
political unity.
Because the EC has allegedly "talked in the name of Europe, but
thought in terms of an American shield,"'3 7 its recognition as a capa-
ble foreign policy-making body is questionable. For example, in mo-
ments of common danger, Britain sides with the United States.38
Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher looked more to-
ward the United States than her fellow EC members in gauging the
British response to the Gulf crisis.
Another example of the divergent EC response to the Iraq crisis,
and one that commanded substantial media attention, was French
President Francois Mitterrand's initiative. President Mitterrand, in a
speech before the United Nations General Assembly, proposed a four-
stage process to resolve the Middle East tensions.3 9 This maneuver
met with fierce criticism from the rest of the EC.
This unfortunate episode, perhaps more than any other single
factor, muffled a unified EC voice in the Gulf crisis.4° It also high-
lighted an inherent problem of EC political unity, the divisive force of
national concerns. France itself supplied Iraq with most of the so-
phisticated arms that the French, United States, British and other
troops faced in the Gulf.41 Additionally, in light of President Mitter-
rand's statement and the subsequent selective release by Saddam Hus-
sein of nine French hostages, France was on the defensive against its
neighbors. 42 France claimed that its statement was gravely misunder-
35. Nicholas Kotch, Western Europe Steps Up Anti-Iraq Moves, REUTER LIBR. REP.,
Aug. 21, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LBYRPT File.
36. Id.
37. America's Unpaid Debt, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Aug. 26, 1990, at 18.
38. Id.
39. Douglas Hamilton, France Says No To Negotiations, No Soft Options Offered To Iraq,
REUTER LIBR. REP., Oct. 1, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LBYRPT file.
40. Rone Tempest, Europeans Have Much To Lose In The Gulf Puzzle; France, Which
Has Pinned Its Mideast Policy On Baghdad For Two Decades, Probably Has The Most At Stake
In The Region, L.A. TiMEs, Sept. 4, 1990, at Hl.
41. Id.
42. See Hamilton, supra note 39.
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stood. Some interpreted President Mitterrand's statement as a call for
negotiations with President Hussein in return for his consideration of
a withdrawal from Kuwait. French presidential spokesman Hubert
Vedrine clarified that President Mitterrand intended an offer to nego-
tiate upon actual withdrawal from Kuwait.43
If Member States continue to take a wholly nationalized stance
in foreign affairs, as France did, the goal of European unification will
constantly be undermined and will ultimately fail. Perhaps the best
that can be said about this situation is that when the EC truly forms a
unified foreign policy, no one of its parts will be in the position, as
France was, to be driven by "short-sighted business interests in earn-
ing a quick franc." 44
IV. THE BENEFITS TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OF AN
EXPANDED FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMPETENCE
A primary hindrance to the EC's foreign policy is that the Mem-
ber States view any step toward enhancing collective power as a corre-
sponding diminution in their individual power.45 The Member States
are apprehensive about this apparent threat to traditional sovereign
power. The time has arrived, however, for each Member State to
loosen its jealous grip on individualized foreign affairs policies and to
yield to the greater EC interests. The approaching single market will
fuse economic, social, and legal interests. This new interdependence
may render the idea of a "national" foreign policy concern a notion of
the past. This results because, out of necessity, the Member States
must divorce themselves from divisive policies lest the EC "evolve
into an economic giant and a foreign policy pygmy."' 46
The SEA's legitimization of EPC has set the stage for rapid pro-
gress by providing a careful and cooperative framework for a single
EC voice in foreign affairs. Although EPC is a strictly intergovern-
mental mechanism that relies upon the consensus of all Member
States, 47 it encourages consensus. Now, more than ever, the EC must
43. Id. See also Tempest, supra note 40, at Hi.
44. See Hamilton, supra note 39.
45. Another hindrance to EC foreign policy unity is the existence of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization ("NATO"). NATO's Secretary-General, Manford Woerner, has com-
mented that he would welcome the EC's assumption of greater foreign policy and defense
responsibility, but if this usurped NATO's role, it could threaten Europe's ties with the United
States. See Peter Guilford, Warning to EC on Pact Role, THE TIMES (London), Sept. 21, 1990.
46. Bruce Stokes, Continental Shift, 22 NAT'L J. 1996, 1996 (1990).
47. SCHWARZE, TOWARDS A EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY-LEGAL ASPECTS, To-
WARDS A EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY 76-77 (J. de Vree et al. eds., 1987).
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realize the benefits of this opportunity.
First, and most importantly, the European single market renders
any formal separation between economic and foreign policies dysfunc-
tional and obsolete.48 The single market will result in virtual eco-
nomic interdependence of the Member States.4 9 No Member State
can continue to develop individual external policies when its economy
becomes one-twelfth of a whole. European integration mandates a
common foreign policy stance. A Member State can no longer engage
in unilateral action without contemplating the effect on all Member
States. This is not merely a matter of obligation under Article 30 of
the SEA, but one of self-interest. A threat to one Member State in a
single market context is a threat to the unit as a whole.
Second, with an expanded EC role in foreign policy, the EC can
take advantage of and build upon the various special relationships
that have already developed between individual Member States and
third countries. For example, the United Kingdom has a close rela-
tionship with the United States; Greece, given its stage of economic
development, maintains ties with many less developed countries; and
Spain and Portugal have strong ties with both Latin American and
Third World countries. 50
Additionally, a unified EC will render a third country less capa-
ble of manipulating one of the Member States in a polarizing fashion.
Indeed, Saddam Hussein may have accomplished such manipulation
when he announced the release of all French hostages on October 23,
1990, to the exclusion of other nationals. 1 An EC foreign policy
would make this type of tactic less feasible.
Further, an enlarged foreign affairs competence would allow the
EC to become an active, rather than a reactive, force. The goal of
EPC, in essence, is to encourage the EC to gradually develop common
principles and objectives. When crisis develops, the lack of an affirm-
ative EC position may lead to inconsistent reactions among Member
States, as was seen in the Gulf War. With a well-reasoned, common
foreign policy already established, however, decisions will be made on
the basis of a solid foundation. This would reduce the likelihood of a
48. Note, A Community Within the Community: Prospects for Foreign Policy Integration
in the European Community, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1066, 1075 (1990).
49. Id.
50. RoY H. GINSBERG, FOREIGN POLICY ACTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
160 (1989).
51. Edward Cody, Iraq Frees 14 Americans, Says All French Can Go, WASH. POST, Oct.
24, 1990, at Al.
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reflexive reaction in the heat of a crisis. It would also catapult the EC
into crisis management, instead of a scramble for an appropriate ini-
tial response.5
2
Moreover, a set EC foreign policy could arguably diffuse a situa-
tion and prevent a crisis from developing. That is, a set and predict-
able policy may be the EC's best protective strategy in world affairs.
If the EC speaks with one strong voice instead of twelve it will, of its
own unified force, be a powerful sculptor of foreign affairs. With the
rest of the world and future terrorists aware of the announced EC
stance, they will surely consider the ramifications before acting.
Finally, it is only through unity that the EC will realize its
strength in the international arena. The 1992 integration of its eco-
nomic interests in a single market dictates that the EC act efficiently
by pooling its resources, both monetary and political. A common EC
foreign policy will command far more attention and result in greater
influence than could any single Member State on its own.
V. CONCLUSION
The SEA and its treatment of EPC represents a great contributes
to the vision of a unified Europe in the area of foreign policy. Its
framework calls only for consultation, taking into account the posi-
tions of others and endeavoring to develop common European posi-
tions. The SEA lends the EPC a flexibility that is so critical in the
developmental stages of this program.5 3 Anything more rigid before
completion of the single market would arrest such a program before it
had the opportunity to flourish.
52. Reinhardt Rummel, Speaking with One Voice - And Beyond, in EUROPEAN POLIT-
ICAL COOPERATION IN THE 1980s 122-23 (Alfred Pijpers et al. eds., 1988).
53. Barry E. Carter, A Code of Conduct for EC-US relations (1988), reprinted in THE
EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, IN PARTICULAR EC-US RELA-
TIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS TO AN INTERNATIONAL COLLOQUIUM ORGANIZED BY THE EURO-
PEAN POLICY UNIT OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE, ITALY, 26-27
MAY 1988 (Jurgen Schwarze ed., 1989). Professor Carter discusses the strategies and tactics
which will facilitate optimum progress in improving US-EC relations. One such strategy is to
minimize formal legal arrangements, particularly at the early stages of such an effort, thereby
maintaining the flexibility so critical to its success.
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